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Legislators adapt their policies and agendas to public priorities. Yet research on dynamic 
representation usually focuses on the influence of public opinion through surveys leaving 
out other public opinion signals. We incorporate mobilization of the public through 
protest. Combining insights from social movement studies and political science, we expect 
protest not to have a direct effect on attention change in legislative agendas. If anything 
protest should have an amplification effect on public priorities. Using a new and unique 
data set covering collective action, public opinion and legislative agendas across almost 
40 years in four Western democracies, we confirm the effect of public opinion through 
surveys but find no support for a direct effect of protest. Protest rarely moves legislators: 
only in very specific issues will protest interact with public priorities and affect attention 
change in legislative agendas. Our results have important implications for policy 
representation. 
 





Responsiveness of policymakers to the issue priorities of the public is an important aspect of 
democratic representation (e.g., Bevan and Jennings 2014). Yet, since attention is scarce, 
policymakers frequently cannot attend to all incoming information by their citizens (e.g., Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005). This leads policymakers to focus their attention on issues citizens 
care most about while ignoring others the public is less concerned with (e.g., Mortensen et 
al. 2011). In political science, an impressive body of research has put these basic ideas of 
democratic representation to test and confirms that policymakers tend to respond on issues that 
are important to the public (e.g., Burstein and Linton 2002). 
 
Far less attention, however, has been paid to different types of opinion signals and how they 
might affect, thwart or reinforce each other. Although numerous accounts show that 
politicians attend to a variety of sources when trying to figure out what the public cares about 
– for instance, from mass media (Herbst 1998), over contact with constituents (Fenno 1978), 
opinion polling (Geer 1996) to different forms of advocacy (Burstein 2014) – this variety of 
signals has not been adequately reflected in the empirical literature on democratic representation. 
Our study addresses this research gap. Besides public opinion through surveys, we add one 
other expression of public opinion to the puzzle: protest. We ask: Do policymakers react to 
issues primed by protest? And, how does the influence of protest compare to the cues presented 
by public opinion in the polls? 
 
Studying responsiveness to protest and how protest and public opinion signals relate to each 
other is important for a number of reasons. First, in the last few decades, mobilization of public 
opinion through protest has increased across Western democracies (Dalton 2017), challenging 
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the role of political parties as traditional channels of representation. Social movement scholars 
and comparativists speak of “demonstration democracies” and “social movement societies” 
(Norris et al. 2005; Dalton 2008). From a democratic theory perspective, thus, this rise in 
protest brings about the question of whether governments should be responsive to this other, 
mobilized form of public opinion. 
 
Second, this rise in protest has renewed attention to the political consequences of protest as 
well, although primarily in sociology (for a review, see Amenta et al. 2010). Although 
comparative scholarship has identified an agenda-setting effect of protest – i.e. when protest 
activity relating to an issue increases, political elites start to devote more attention to that issue 
(Vliegenthart et al. 2016: 838) – contrary to the political science research on democratic 
linkage, studies on the impact of protest have produced mixed findings (Giugni 2007; Uba 
2009). One reason for these inconclusiveness is that the lion’s share of protest impact studies are 
case studies, focusing on one movement or issue in a single country, giving researchers little 
leverage to tease out potential contingencies (but see: Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012; 
Vliegenthart et al. 2016; Hutter and Vliegenthart 2016). 
 
Third, how the impact of protest relates to alternative expressions of public opinion known to 
determine policy making – like opinion polls – has so far received only scant empirical attention 
(Burstein and Linton 2002). Work by Agnone (2007) and Giugni (2007) point towards an 
interaction effect of protest and public opinion. While Agnone proposes an “amplification 
model”, whereby the impact of public opinion on legislative action is greater depending on 
the level of protest, Giugni argues for a “joint-effect model”, where movement impact on policy 
change is forthcoming when public opinion intervenes together with movement mobilization. 
However, such ideas have only been tested on a limited number of countries or issues. 
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With this study, we seek to contribute to both political science and sociology. We expand the 
limited comparative studies of dynamic agenda representation by adding protest to the mix of 
incoming signals; and we contribute to the literature on protest impact by scrutinizing multiple 
issues across multiple countries. To date, we are unaware of comparative studies that jointly 
consider the impact of public opinion through surveys and public opinion through protest on 
policymakers’ legislative agendas. 
 
We hypothesize that public priorities, as expressed through surveys, have a stronger impact on 
legislative agendas compared to public priorities as expressed through protest. The main signaling 
function of protest, we suggest, lies in sensitizing legislators to certain issues that are already quite 
dominant across the general public, as such amplifying the impact of general public opinion 
signals (Agnone 2007; Giugni 2007). 
 
Based on a novel assembled dataset, we present a series of error correction models of time-
series cross-sectional data on legislative agendas collected by the Comparative Agendas Project 
(CAP), public issue priorities from a variety of national opinion polls, and protest from three 
different data sources across almost 40 years (1974-2011) in Germany, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Our study is the first that combines data on public opinion 
polls, protest and legislative agendas across countries and for such a long time span. 
 
Our pooled analysis confirms established findings on long-term effects of public issue priorities on 
policy agendas and reveals that protest does not have any impact on change in legislative agendas. 
This general pattern is largely supported in issue-specific analyses, whereby protest only has a 
significant effect on one issue – social welfare. However, we find support for an amplification 
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mechanism in cases of domestic policy that touch citizens’ life more directly like education, 
housing and unemployment. 
 
On the one hand, we find that protest does not play much of an important role in changing 
policymakers’ attention in legislative agendas, legitimizing political scientists’ ignorance of this 
democratic input signal allegedly on the rise. On the other hand, our findings do suggest that 
protest can be an influential informational resource for policy-making. The impact of protest, 
however, is highly contingent and only rarely materializes. Only if protesters’ signal is strong 
and supported by public priorities will protest matter for attention changes. 
 
Our findings have important implication for mass-elite linkages and social movement strategies. 
Our finding that policymakers follow signals from the public at large but not to specific groups in 
the society confirms that democratic governments tend to represent and respond to the concerns 
of the general public rather than to the priorities of a particularly active segment of the public. 
Our finding is thus reassuring for those who see demonstration democracies as a threat to the 
representation of the silent majority in favor of the representation of a loud minority. On the 
other side, the very limited influence of protest may be disappointing for those who, instead, 
hoped for a more profound influence on agenda dynamics of more engaged parts of the 
public. 
 
Our result that protest has a larger influence on issue attention in legislation when the priorities 
of protesters are strong and aligned to the priorities of the general public, even if for a limited 
number of issues, is important for social movement strategies and confirms previous findings 
of a limited impact of protest on policy (e.g., Burstein and Linton 2002; Giugni 2007). Our 
findings are to some extent in line with Agnone’s (2007) amplification mechanism and suggest 
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that the context in which protest takes place is crucial in determining the power of protest itself. 
The protest’s role in influencing policymakers’ attention would be more successful if understood 
as a salience-raising element rather than an independent signal. 
 
How legislative agendas adapt to external stimuli 
 
Political science research on the opinion-policy nexus is old and venerable. The common denominator 
of the incredible amount of studies on the opinion-policy relationship is that public opinion 
has been essentially studied as a monolithic entity, namely the mean voter, measured through 
public opinion polls (for an overview, see: Manza and Cook 2002). 
 
In general, research suggests that public opinion sends two signals to policymakers. First, the 
public reveals its opinion through expressing their policy preferences – e.g., asking for more or 
less spending (Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Second, the public also signals the 
importance or priority of policy issues – e.g., by naming the most important issue facing the 
nation (Wlezien 2005; Jennings and Wlezien 2011). This duality has generated two strands of 
research. The first perspective looks at responsiveness in terms of position and investigates 
whether citizens’ preferences have an impact on policy outputs (e.g., Lax and Phillips 2009; 
Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Lax and Phillips 2012). The second perspective looks at 
responsiveness in terms of attention and investigates whether policymakers adapt their 
agendas to citizens’ issue priorities (e.g., Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Mortensen et al. 2011; 
Bevan and Jennings 2014). 
 
Importantly, governments first need to pay attention to public issue priorities for policy 
responsiveness to preferences can happen (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The former is a 
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precondition for the latter. We analyze whether attention change in legislative agendas responds 
to changes in issue priorities of the public. We know from previous research that different policy 
issues promote different levels of policy representation – e.g., responsiveness on domestic issues 
is found to be higher than on foreign policy issues (e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963; Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2005) – and that the latter also depends on issue salience (e.g., Page and Shapiro 
1982; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). If dynamic agenda representation works, then when an issue 
becomes salient to the public, it is more likely that the government will respond on that issue by 
paying more attention to it in its agendas. For our purposes, this implies that a change in public 
opinion’s priorities would be followed by a change of government priorities in its legislative 
agenda.1 
 
Two mechanisms are understood to drive legislators’ responsiveness on salient issues: 
policymakers’ desire of being re-elected and attention scarcity. On the one hand, salient issues 
should be decisive at the ballot box. Since legislators have a tremendous interest in seeking re-
election they cannot afford to neglect voters’ concerns and demands (Downs 1957; Strøm 1990; 
Stimson et al. 1995), and this also applies to citizens’ issue priorities. On the other hand, given the 
complexity and the amount of public demands, attention is scarce and this has severe 
consequences for agenda representation (Kingdon 1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Jennings 
and John 2009; Bevan and Jennings 2014). Hence, policymakers prioritize those issues on their 
agendas which are most important to the public and pay less attention to the ones the public is 
less concerned with (Mortensen et al. 2011). 
 
We note that most of previous work on agenda responsiveness (and congruence) focuses on 
rhetorical agendas and research based on legislative agendas is mostly made of single-country 
studies (Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011; John et al. 2011; 
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Lindeboom 2012; Brunner 2013; Visconti 2018). Thus, we believe that a comparative test on 
the effect of public priorities on change in legislative agendas is still important, not only in 
comparison with protest priorities but also for enlarging existing empirical evidence. In 
summary, we agree with previous research and suggest that policymakers adapt their legislative 
priorities to public priorities: 
 
Public Opinion Hypothesis: Public issue priorities have an effect on attention change in 
legislative agendas. 
 
Whereas evidence for the translation of public issue priorities to policy priorities is robust, there 
is less consensus regarding the role of political protest in democratic linkage processes (for a 
recent overview see: Amenta et al. 2010). For long, the power of protest to shape the legislative 
agenda has been left empirically unexplored. Whereas sociologists presumed social movement 
activity to be an important force of social change and, therefore, studied processes of protest 
emergence and mobilization (McAdam 1982), political scientists regarded protesters as “beggars 
at the policy gates”, not even considering protest when studying democratic linkage. 
 
Since the turn of the century, however, the legislative impact of protest has become increasingly 
empirically scrutinized, albeit primarily by sociologists (Amenta et al. 2005; Andrews 2001; Soule 
et al. 1999; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012), less so by political scientists (but see: Costain 
and Majstorovic 1994; Gillion 2013). Moreover, most of these studies tend to be case studies, 
focusing on a single movement or issue, hindering generalization (for multiple issue studies, see: 
Hutter and Vliegenthart 2016; Vliegenthart et al. 2016). The standing conclusion of this 
literature is that protest can matter, but that it does so rarely independently or directly. Rather, 
the impact of protest is contingent upon the context in which it is organized. In the next few 
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paragraphs we elaborate on this argument from a policymakers’ perspective. 
 
Why would policymakers be responsive to protest signals? Skeptics hold that there is little 
incentive for elected officials to respond to protest. As gaining re-election is the main goal for 
elected officials, their actions should especially be guided by what occupies the majority of the 
public (Arnold 1990). So, only when protest succeeds to make a powerful assertion of popular 
sovereignty, it might directly influence policymakers (Wouters and Walgrave 2017). Most 
often, however, protest is staged by disenfranchised actors with more extreme, minoritarian 
stances and select, deviating priorities compared to the median voter (Lohmann 1993). Giugni 
(2007: 54) underscores the limited signaling strength of protest when he describes movements 
as “minority actors that have little power”. Burstein and Linton (2002) hold that the potential 
political impact of protest is probably only moderate at best, and likely to decline or even dis- 
appear when measures of public opinion are taken into account. Amenta (2014) goes even a step 
further and posits that protests are often counterproductive because protesters frequently 
mobilize in response to threatening political circumstances. 
 
Two empirical findings further ground the claim of no direct link between protest and 
legislation. First, several studies find that especially organizational capacity and institutional 
strategies of movements (for instance lawsuits and other legal actions, petitioning, letter-writing, 
lobbying, press conferences) matter in shaping policy outcomes, far less so the extra-
institutional strategy of protest (Johnson et al. 2010; Soule and Olzak 2004). Second, research 
suggests that the influence of protest is most likely at the early agenda-setting stage and 
decreases dramatically along the policy cycle (King et al. 2007; McAdam and Su 2002). In sum, 
there are reasons to expect that protest has no direct effect on attention change in legislative 
agendas, or at best weaker compared to that of public opinion through polls. Here, for the first 
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time, we formally test such a hypothesis across a multitude of issues and countries: 
 
Protest Hypothesis: Protest does not have a direct effect on attention change in legislative 
agendas. 
 
Social movement scholars have developed more comprehensive frameworks to account for the 
impact of protest, however. In line with the dominant political opportunity perspective and the 
political mediation model (Amenta et al. 2005; Kriesi et al. 1995), these studies hold that 
especially a favorable context is decisive for movement success (Amenta et al. 2005; Johnson et 
al. 2010; Soule and Olzak 2004; Vliegenthart et al. 2016). Without supportive external resources 
presented by a favorable context, protest is toothless; given the right circumstances, however, 
protest can make a difference. For instance, the presence of political allies and the composition of 
governments (Amenta et al. 2010; Lipsky 1968) or favorable media attention (Vliegenthart et al. 
2016; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012) is expected to boost protest power. 
 
Here, we focus on one other key characteristic of the political context: the issue priorities of 
the general public. We expect the impact of public opinion on legislative agendas to increase 
when also protest activity on that particular issue increases. Our argument is straightforward. 
Protest amplifies the effect of public opinion on policy as it raises the salience and visibility of 
an issue for legislators. As attention is scarce and politicians operate in a complex and volatile 
information environment, situations in which protest cues are congruent with citizens’ priorities 
are more likely to induce legislative action. We know only of two studies that test this 
moderating role between public opinion and protest. Both Giugni (2007) and Agnone (2007), 
in what they respectively call a “joint-effect model” and “amplification model”, mount evidence 
that protest indeed sensitizes legislators to public opinion. We formalize this reinforcing link 
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between public opinion and protest in our third hypothesis: 
 
Amplification Hypothesis: The effect of public issue priorities on attention change in 
legislative agendas rises with increasing protest. 
 
Data and methods 
 
We are interested in the relationship between public priorities, protest and legislative agendas. 
Ideally, our data should ensure a measure of these concepts across a large sample of countries 
and time in order to estimate pooled time-series cross-section analyses. Unfortunately, 
comparable cross-national data for all three concepts is scarce. However, we managed to 
compile comparable data for Germany (1986-2011), Spain (1983-2011), the United Kingdom 
(1980-2011) and the United States (1974-1995). 
 
To measure legislative agendas, we rely on the data stemming from the collection efforts by 
the CAP (Breunig and Schnatterer 2018; John et al. 2013).2 The CAP team collects legislative 
agendas across a total of 20 countries. Based on an exhaustive codebook, human coders allocate 
legislation to major topics as displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. CAP issue codes 
1. Macroeconomics 12. Law, Crime 
2. Civil Rights 13. Social Welfare 
3. Health 14. Housing 
4. Agriculture 15. Banking, Finance* 
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5. Labor and Employment 16. Defense + 19. International Affairs 
6. Education 17. Science* 
7. Environment + 8. Energy 18. Foreign Trade* 
9 Immigration 20. Government Operations* 
10. Transportation* 21. Public Lands* 
 
Notes: * indicates major topic excluded from our analysis due to missing protest and/or 
public priorities data. 
 
We rely on the Statutes of the American Congress and on UK Acts of Parliament to measure 
legislative agendas in the US and the UK respectively. In all cases the coded time point is the 
date upon which a bill was signed into law. For Germany and Spain we used data on 
legislative bills adopted by parliament. While the regulations of who introduces legislation 
and how it is adopted varies across our sample, in most countries legislation is crucially 
depending on support by the government. Instead of using the counted number of laws for each 
country and time period, we calculated the share of legislation for each year and country – 
similar to previous research based on CAP data (Jennings and John 2009; Bevan and Jennings 
2014). 
 
To measure public priorities – the set of policy issues to which the public attends (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2004) – we use surveys inquiring the ‘most important problem/issue’ (MIP/MII) 
facing the country. Although some discussion exists on the unclear definition in the most 
important problem/issue – i.e., whether an issue is really a problem, whether salience and 
importance are the same thing and whether variation in problem status can be correlated with 
importance over time (for details see: Wlezien 2005; Jennings and Wlezien 2011) – Jennings 
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and Wlezien (2011: 554-555) find that MIP and MII series ‘capture many of the same things, 
both at particular points in time and over time’. Hence, we use the aggregated MIP/MII 
responses to quantify public priorities. To guarantee comparability to the legislative agendas 
outlined above, we recoded all answers into the CAP’s major topics described in Table 1.
3 We 
then calculated the percentage of respondents listing a problem/issue the most important for each 
major CAP topic. 
 
We merge three different datasets on collective action to retrieve the necessary information on 
political protest. First, we use the European Protest and Coercion dataset (EPCD) to measure 
protest in Germany, the UK and Spain from 1980 until 1995 (Francisco 1995, 1996, 2004). 
Unfortunately, the EPCD dataset does not cover the time period after 1995. Thus, starting in 
1996 we relied on a dataset collected by Swen Hutter (2014) which largely continues the research 
undertaken by Kriesi and colleagues (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995). For the United Stated we employ the 
Dynamics of Collective Action (DCA) database for the entire period of observation (1974-
1995) (McAdam and Su 2002). Full information about the protest datasets and their 
assemblage is reported in Section A2, while summary statistics of all variables and protest by 
CAP issue are reported in Tables A1-A2 of the Online Appendix.  
 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the structure of our data and provide a face validity check by using a 
smoothed local function (splines) to visually test if our data reports distinct and crucial breaks 
in the time trend (outliers with values larger than 0.6 are omitted). If such breaks are visible 
and align with the time period for which we use a different data source for the European countries 
(1996) it would suggest that the datasets are reporting significantly different protest trends across 
time. As shown in Figure 1, however, protests follow a comparably smooth trend between 
datasets. To be sure that coding differences between datasets are not worrying for our analyses, 
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we also tested for breaks by estimating a time-series model differentiating the three data sources 
we are relying on. The major difference we are interested in is whether the continuation of Kriesi’s 
work by Hutter reveals significant time trend differences. To do so we coded a dummy variable 
which is ‘1’ for all time periods for which we use Swen Hutter’s dataset. Again, we do not 
find a significant break in our time-series (β=5.9e
−10
; P =0.114). This suggests that using 
percentages of protest frequency is a reliable measure across datasets.4 
 
Figure 2, next, provides face validity for the quality of our data focusing on one crucial issue in our 
data: the environment. Notice that the scaling of the y-axes varies across countries to ensure 
readability of the US case. For instance, a clear peak of environmental protests in Germany is 
visible after the meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear plant starting around 1986 and ending 
towards the 1990s. A comparable peak is visible for the US after the Three Mile Island 
accident in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (1979). Finally, differences between public priorities 
and protesters’ priorities are visible both across time and countries. While environmental concerns 
are of low salience both for the public and protesters’ in the US, strong discrepancies are visible 
especially for Spain in the 2000s. 
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Similar to previous research on dynamic agenda representation, we use an error correction model 
to analyze our data. More specifically, we estimate the following model in order to test our 
first two hypotheses (the Public Opinion Hypothesis and the Protest Hypothesis): 
 
∆Legislative Agendai,t = α0 + β1Legislative Agendai,t−1 
+β2∆Public Prioritiesi,t + β3Public Prioritiesi,t−1 
+β4∆Protest Prioritiesi,t + β5Protest Prioritiesi,t−1 
+ζi,t  + si,t                                                                                                                                 (1) 
 
with the dependent variable being ∆LegislativeAgendat, which denotes change in issue 
attention in legislative agendas between time t and time t − 1, α the intercept, ζ a set of control 
variables outlined below, and s the error term. Since we do not have strong theoretical reasons 
for restricting our model and we are interested in testing both short- and long-term effects of 
public priorities and protest, we follow De Boef and Keele’s (2008) advice and estimate an 
unrestricted model. Hence, ∆PublicPrioritiest and ∆ProtestP rioritiest denote the change in 
public opinion priorities and protest frequency between time t and time t − 1, respectively, 
whereas PublicPrioritiest−1 and ProtestP rioritiest−1 denote previous levels of public priorities 
and protest frequency, respectively. The coefficient on the variable LegislativeAgendat−1 
denotes policymakers’ long-term attention and evaluates whether policymakers that increased 
legislation on a given issue in the previous time period tend to legislate less on that issue in the 
current time period. 
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If the Public Opinion Hypothesis is supported, we should expect a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on either the ∆PublicPrioritiest or the PublicPrioritiest−1 variables. If 
the Protest Hypothesis is supported, we should, instead, expect an insignificant coefficient on both 
the ∆ProtestPrioritiest and the ProtestPrioritiest−1 variables. 
 
To evaluate the Amplification Hypothesis,  we test the conditional effect of public opinion and 
protest by including two interaction terms, one for the short- and one for the long-term effects: 
∆PublicPrioritiest×∆ProtestPrioritiest and PublicPrioritiest−1×ProtestPrioritiest−1. 
If the hypothesis is supported, we should expect a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient in either of the two variables. The model is presented in equation 2: 
 
∆Legislative Agendai,t = α0 + β1Legislative Agendai,t−1 
+β2∆Public Prioritiesi,t + β3Public Prioritiesi,t−1 
+β4∆Protest Prioritiesi,t + β5Protest Prioritiesi,t−1 
+β6∆Public Prioritiesi,t × ∆Protest Prioritiesi,t 
+β7Public Prioritiesi,t−1 × Protest Prioritiesi,t−1 
+ζi,t  + si,t                                                                                                                               (2) 
 
To efficiently use our data and to increase our statistical power, we rely on a stacked dataset. Our 
models are based on country-year observations, which are stacked by issue. Each country-year 
observation, hence, can appear 12 times, as there are 12 different issues in our dataset. Thus, the 
Gauss Markov assumptions of standard OLS regression analysis are likely to be violated. 
Indeed, autocorrelation tests reveal that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation needs to be 
rejected.
5 Further test-statistics provide evidence that the error terms are heteroscedastic and 
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stationary.
6 The lagged dependent variable controls for autocorrelation. Given that the dataset 
is stacked by issues, we multi-way cluster our standard errors by country × years in the pooled 
analysis. In the country- and issue-specific models, we use robust standard errors due to the 
small clusters included in these analyses. Furthermore, as unobserved heterogeneity potentially 
infringes the results, we include country fixed effects in most models. 
 
As it is common in time-series-cross-section analysis using lagged variables, it is difficult to 
judge how long an introduced lag should be. Law making is a cumbersome process, it can take 
time for legislators to prepare, discuss, draft, re-draft and to adopt legislation. Therefore, a lag 
of one year seems plausible and has been also used in most earlier research about legislative 
agendas and its adaptation to public opinion and protest (e.g., Bevan and Jennings 2014; Stimson 




Table 2 reports the findings from these model specifications using country fixed effects. 
Column 1 presents our baseline model, where the direct effect of public priorities and protest is 
tested. Column 2 interacts the short-term effect of protest and public priorities. Column 3 interacts 
the long-run effect of protest and public priorities. Column 4 presents the full model with both 
short-term and long-term interaction variables. 
 
Table 2. Does protest influence attention change in legislative agendas? No. 
 ∆legislative agendai,t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
legislative -0.325*** -0.325*** -0.326*** -0.326*** 
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country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.157 0.158 0.157 0.158 
adj. R2 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 
N 1111 1111 1111 1111 
 
Notes: pooled (12 topics × 117 country/years) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Before turning to effects pertaining to public priorities, note that the coefficient on the 
variable LegislativeAgendat−1 is negative and significant in all analyses, while the coefficient 
on the intercept is positive and significant, implying a “regression to the mean” in legislative 
attention. That is, when legislative attention was unusually high (low) during the previous 




In line with previous research, we find support for our Public Opinion Hypothesis, whereby we 
observe substantively meaningful effects of public priorities on legislative agendas. A one 
percentage point increase of public priorities is associated with a 6 % higher chance of 
drafting a corresponding legislation. This suggests that, in general, legislators in our countries 
are responsive to public priorities in the long-run. Similar to previous studies, we do not find a 
significant short-term effect of public opinion priorities on attention change in legislative agendas. 
We think that this finding is plausible, for the outcome we care about is legislation. As outlined 
above, adopting legislation can take time which plausibly rules out short-term responsive 
reactions by legislators to changes in public priorities. 
 
Turning to our Protest Hypothesis that protest does not have a direct effect on legislation, we 
again find support for our hypothesis. In our analyses we do not find a significant effect of protest 
on legislation. We estimate the protest effect to be negative, suggesting that, if anything, protest 
is negatively associated with attention change in legislative agendas. As described in some 
research above cited, protest is frequently perceived as a signal from protesting minorities and 
not perceived as a relevant source of information driving the legislative agenda. The coefficient 
on the protest variables is smaller in size than the one on public priorities and not statistically 
significant. 
 
Finally, looking into columns 2 to 4 of Table 2, we do not find any support for an 
amplification mechanisms. Both short-term and long-term interactions are positive and point in the 
direction of an amplification mechanism, but they are not significant on conventional 
statistical thresholds.9 
In short, our findings suggest that legislative agendas respond to public agendas but not protest 
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agendas and we also find no evidence for an amplification effect of protest and public opinion. 
The robustness of this evidence has been thoroughly tested and all additional analyses are 
reported in Section A3 (Tables A3-A6) of the Online Appendix. 
 
Analyzing cross-issue variation 
 
To better understand our findings, we re-estimated our models at the issue level. It might be the 
case that the association between protest and legislative agendas varies across issues with some 
issue domains being more plausibly affected by protest than others. Figure 3 reports the 
coefficients stemming from issue-based models with 95 % confidence intervals using the same 
estimation strategy as outlined above.10 The upper panel reports the direct effect of protest on 
legislative agendas. The bottom panel reports the long running interactions between protest and 
public priorities. 
 






The upper panel supports our previous results of no direct effect of protest on change in legislative 








































































Interaction protest X public priorities
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social welfare. Here, protest seems to be an important source of information to develop 
legislation. We also find negative and significant but small effects of protest on legislation on 
issues on defense. However, these effects are substantively negligible and confidence in the point 
estimates is small as indicated by the large confidence intervals. 
 
Turning our attention to the bottom panel, we find substantively meaningful and positive 
significant effects for the interaction between public priorities and protest for legislation on 
educational, housing and unemployed issues. Protest frequency on these obtrusive issues tends 
to upscale at various points in time in our data. Interestingly, however, questions of housing 
and education tend to rank low in public priorities. It seems that for these issues legislators 
nevertheless tend to listen more closely when protesters are active on the policy domain. This 
might be because politicians anticipate potential public reactions given the obtrusive nature of 
the issue when executing their legislative work. Finally, unemployment ranks high both for the 
public and protesters throughout various points in time. Here, we clearly observe an amplification 
mechanism as outlined by Agnone (2007). 
 
Figure 4 reports the marginal effect of this interaction with 95 % confidence intervals. It 
becomes visible that the amplification mechanism seems to be working throughout most values 
of political protest. The effect is substantive in size making legislation more likely by 11 %. 
Given the high protest activity on the issue, particularly in Spain (throughout time), the United 
Kingdom (throughout time) and Germany (in the 1990s), an amplification effect seems most 
plausible on this issue instead of low-salience issues, such as the environment, which face 
infrequent protest activity throughout most periods we analyze. 
 





Conclusion and discussion 
 
Responsiveness to the issue priorities of the public is an essential part of democratic 
representation. According to democratic theory, what elected officials pay attention to should 
be in tune with what the public cares about. Yet how legislators respond to different kinds of 
public opinion signals is still an open question. Given the rise of protest in Western democracies 
as a means to express public grievances (Norris et al. 2005), we considered two types of public 
opinion signals: public issue priorities as measured through surveys and public issue priorities as 
expressed through protest.  
 
Bridging political science and social movement literature, we hypothesized that both public 
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particular segment of) the public considers important. We, therefore, expected the political 
consequences of both to be different as well. Based on a novel assembled dataset, 
encompassing four countries and twelve issues over a twenty years’ time span, we find public 
priorities as expressed through surveys to have a strong and positive impact on legislative 
attention. This finding is robust and confirms much of the previous research on dynamic 
representation. Protest, the alternative signal, has no significant effect on legislative attention. 
Moreover, the direction of the non-significant protest effect is negative. This confirms the 
classic image held by political scientists of protesters as beggars at the policy gate. 
 
It is very likely, as we have put forward, that elected officials consider survey-based public issue 
priorities as more legitimate representations of the priorities of the general public. Priorities as 
expressed through protest, on the other hand, are considered as only the priorities of a particularly 
active segment, offering a biased view of the true public’s priorities. Moreover, if protest is 
especially reactive, triggered by political disadvantages, the negative effect of protest is easily 
explained by the stickiness of the legislative agenda. Earlier policy stages might be more 
sensitive to protest cues, as previous research has shown, but once policy has changed and 
protest is triggered, chances of adaptation decrease. 
 
The stronger effect of public opinion’s priorities also might be a consequence of the clarity of the 
survey-based priority agenda. Public priorities are more clearly articulated through surveys, 
with some issues capturing the lion’s share of attention and many issues staying well below 
the radar. In case of protest, many different issues capture only a moderate share of the agenda. 




Protest signals are not entirely without legislative consequences, however. Contrary to the effect 
of public priorities, the effect of protest proves to be extremely contingent. This finding 
resonates with accounts of sociologists, who argue that protest especially can make a 
difference when staged in the right context. We find that only protest tackling social welfare 
issues has a direct and positive effect on change in legislative agendas. And, we find that 
protest amplifies the effect of public priorities – but only for the issues of housing, education 
and unemployment, i.e. issues that are very much of a “bread and butter” nature. These are 
issues that strongly impact citizens’ lives. They are all quite obtrusive and, if not solved or 
accommodated, might play out as central issues in upcoming elections. It is reasonable for 
legislators to avoid further politicization of such issues, and drafting legislation might be one way 
to get the noisy protesters off the public radar before they cause even more harm. 
 
Our data does not allow us to exactly put our finger on why the impact of protest materializes 
only under these specific circumstances, yet allows us to speculate about such conditions, 
which might inspire future research. For instance, the direct positive effect of protest on social 
welfare legislation might be a consequence of protest being staged by strong sponsoring 
organizations. These organizations often occupy insider positions and are well embedded 
within civil society and the policy making machinery. On the other hand, a more fine-grained lag 
structure than the one our data allows is important to better address the “timing” issue of agenda 
responsiveness. 
 
Additionally, we expect that a focus on both characteristics of the signal and elements of the 
context will help researchers to disentangle the complex knot of diverse democratic linkage 
across public opinion signals. For instance, the institutional characteristics of the political 
system might moderate the impact of both public opinion and protest on legislation. In fact, 
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Vliegenthart et al. (2016) find that the impact of protest is moderated by features of the political 
system via media attention on parliamentary questions; with stronger impact of protest in 
majoritarian compared to consensus democracies.  
 
Finally, another specification of our general model might alter the temporal structure of the 
responsiveness chain. Although evidence is slim, several studies suggest that the impact of 
protest on legislation might be sequential, as in a two-step process, with protest first raising the 
attention of the public, and public opinion subsequently affecting legislators (e.g., Giugni 2007; 
McAdam and Su 2002). Similar specifications can be thought of for the receiver side of public 
opinion signals as well: it might be that protest and public opinion signals, in general, or on 
some issues, fare much better with particular parties, or if certain parties are in power. 
Although these specifications probably apply to earlier stages of the legislative process, opposition 
parties might be more responsive to protest compared to governing parties or parties that are 
issue-owner might be more prone to react to protest on that issue compared to others (Hutter 
and Vliegenthart 2016). A crucial finding in the recent wave of political impact studies of protest 
is that exactly the presence of so-called “elite allies” in power is crucial for the success of protest. 
This is a difficult task that future research will have to deal with, as it implies classifying issue 
ownership across a large number of parties, issues and time. 
 
In all, how different public opinion signals translate into legislation turns out to differ strongly 
across signals and presents researchers with a complex puzzle. The analyses presented in this 
paper made a significant step forward by, for the first time, integrating public issue priorities and 
protest priorities across issues and countries and associating these with legislative attention. 
Whereas adaptation of legislation to public priorities as measured through surveys appears to be 
the default, routine, business as usual procedure in politics, the impact of protest shows to be 
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more a matter of the rare, exceptional shock to the system. Our analyses straightforwardly 
confirm decades of research on democratic linkage, and substantiate the use of public priorities 
through surveys as an essential control when estimating the effects of other signals. With respect 





















1. Of course, law-making process is not always motivated by changes in public priorities. 
For instance, institutional friction matters (e.g., Jones et al. 2009; Bevan and Jennings 
2014). Further, while some research suggests that governing parties tend to also focus 
on the issues they own in their legislative agendas (e.g., Egan 2013; Green and Jennings 
2019), government partisanship seems to matter less (e.g., Bevan and Jennings 2014) 
compared to compulsory issues or pressing problems that demand legislative action 
(e.g., Adler and Wilkerson 2012). 
2. The data was originally collected by Laura Chaqués-Bonafont, Anna M. Palau and 
Luz M. Muñoz, with the collaboration of graduate students and the financial support 
of the Spanish Ministry of Innovation and Science and the Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts 
Universitaris i de Recerca (AGAUR). Neither these public institutions nor the original 
collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. Public 
Laws. The Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017. 
www.comparativeagendas.net. Accessed September 26, 2017. 
3. We adapted MIP series compiled by the Politbarometer for Germany, the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) for Spain, Gallup and Ipsos-MORI for the UK and 
Gallup for the US. While we recoded the German and Spanish data ourselves, 
thankfully the CAP team made the UK and US data available online, under: 
http://www.comparativeagendas.net. Since data for the Gallup’s MIP question in the 
UK are not available after 2001, Ipsos-MORI’s MII data are also used; when 
overlapping, the two series are combined and averaged. 
4. To be sure the findings presented below are not driven by one country, we re-estimated 
our analyses separately for each country. Our findings are robust to these modeling 
strategies (see Table A7 and Figure A1 in the Online Appendix). 
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5. A Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel-data models is highly significant. 
6. A Fisher-type unit roots test is highly significant and a Cameron & Trivedi’s 
decomposition of IM-test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
7. However, in the robustness check section we discuss alternative lag structures. 
8. This interpretation holds when the error-correction term is negative and falls between 0 
and -1, when equilibrium shocks are corrected at a gradual rate (Jennings and John 
2009: 841-842). 
9. Notice that we also estimated further combinations of interactions between the short 
and long run- ning effects of protest and public priorities without finding any 
significant conditioning effect by protest on public priorities. E.g. protestt 1 × ∆ public 
prioritiest: β=-0.40; P =0.113.  ∆ protestt × public prioritiest 1: β=-0.30; P =0.008. 
Even though this latter effect is statistically significant on conventional levels, we do 
believe that this might be a finding due to chance: we did not theorize upon such an 
effect and the effect is not in the expected direction. 
10. Note that in these analyses we no longer cluster on the issue level but use robust 
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